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Abstract 
In recent years, several papers have described systems for plausible reasoning which 
do not use numerical measures of uncertainty. Some of these have been based on logic 
and some have been based on causal influences. This paper suggests one way of combin- 
ing the advantages of both types of approach by introducing a means of reasoning with 
causal influences in a proof theoretic way. © 1998 Published by Elsevier Science Inc. 
All rights reserved. 
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I. Introduction 
In the last few years there have been a number of attempts to build systems 
for reasoning under uncertainty that are of a qualitative nature - that is they 
use qualitative rather than numerical values, dealing with concepts uch as in- 
creases in belief and the relative magnitude of values. Between them, these sys- 
tems address the problem of reasoning in situations in which knowledge is 
uncertain, but in which there is a limited amount of numerical information 
quantifying the degree of uncertainty. Three main classes of system can be dis- 
tinguished - systems of abstraction, infinitesimal systems, and systems of argu- 
mentation. In systems of abstraction, the focus is mainly on modelling how the 
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probability of hypotheses changes when evidence is obtained and there is no 
need to commit to exact probability values. They thus provide an abstract 
version of probability theory, known as qualitative probabilistic networks 
(QPNs), which ignores the actual values of individual probabilities but which 
is nevertheless ufficient for planning [30], explanation [6] and prediction [22] 
tasks. Similar systems have also been used to provide an account of default rea- 
soning [17,18]. Infinitesimal systems deal with beliefs that are very nearly 1 or 
0, providing formalisms that handle order of magnitude probabilities. Infinites- 
imal systems may be used for diagnosis [4] as well as providing a general model 
of default reasoning [13], and have been extended with infinitesimal utilities to 
give complete decision theories [26,32]. Systems of argumentation are based on 
the idea of constructing logical arguments for and against formulae, establish- 
ing the overall validity of such formulae by assessing the persuasiveness of the 
individual arguments. Systems of argumentation have been applied to a prob- 
lems such as diagnosis, protocol management and risk assessment [10], as well 
as handling inconsistent information [2], and providing a framework for de- 
fault reasoning [9,16,27]. 
This paper provides ahybridisation of the logical and abstraction approach- 
es by introducing a logical approach to reasoning about how probabilities 
change, which will be called the qualitative probabilistic reasoner (QPR). As 
is argued below, QPR provides a more flexible, expressive, and natural means 
of reasoning about such changes than is currently possible in systems of ab- 
straction. The development ofQPR relies upon a number of results established 
in the study of QPNs. Such results are not explained in any detail since they are 
easily found in the literature (in [7,30]) and would further lengthen this already 
lengthy paper. 
2. The logical language 
2.1. Basic concepts 
We start with a set of atomic propositions La. We also have a set of con- 
nectives {~,/x, 4 ,  ~, ~,}, and the following set of rules for building the well- 
formed formulae (wffs) of the language. 
1. If l E .W then l is a simple well-formed formula (swff). 
2. If l is an swff, then ~l is an swff. 
3. If l and m are swffs then l A m is an swff. 
4. If l and m are swffs then l ~ m is an implicational well-formed formula 
( iwff). 
5. If l, m and n are swffs then l ~ m ,'* n is a synergistic well-formed formula 
(ywyf). 
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6. The set of all wffs is the union of the set of swffs, the set of iwffs, and the set 
of ywffs. 
There are a couple of points that should be noted about the connectives 
which go to make up these formulae. The first point is that neither ~ or 
represents material implication. Instead both represent a constraint on the con- 
ditional probabilities relating the formulae they connect. The second point is 
that this is not the complete set of connectives which can be handled within 
the framework - it is also possible to deal with disjunction and material impli- 
cation [21] - the set is made up of the connectives necessary to capture quali- 
tative probabilistic reasoning of a slightly richer form than that exhibited by 
Wellman's qualitative probabilistic networks (QPNs) [30]. 
The set of all wffs that may be defined using LP, may then be used to build up 
a database A where every item d C A is a triple (i : ! : s) in which i is a token 
uniquely identifying the database item (for convenience we will use the letter 
'i' as an anonymous identifier), l is a wff, and s gives information about the 
probability of l. In particular we take triples (i : l : T) to denote the fact that 
Pr(l) increases, and similar triples (i : / : ~), to denote the fact that Pr(/) de- 
creases. Triples (i : l : ~) ,  denote the fact that Pr(l) is known to neither in- 
crease nor decrease. It should be noted that the triple (i : l : T) indicates that 
Pr(l) either goes up, or does not change - this inclusive interpretation of the 
notion of "increase" is taken from QPNs - and of course a similar proviso ap- 
plies to (i : l : 1). Since we want to reason about changes in belief which equate 
to the usual logical notion of proof, we also consider changes in belief to 1 and 
decrease in belief to 0, indicating these by the use of the symbols # and ~L and 
values which are 1 and 0. The meaning of a triple (i : l : ~) is that the proba- 
bility of l becomes 1, (i : 1 : ~) means that the probability of l becomes 0, 
(i : l : 1) means that the probability of I is 1 and (i : / : 0) means that the prob- 
ability of l is 0. We also have triples (i : l : ~) which indicate that the change in 
Pr(/) is unknown. In addition, for reasons which will become clear later, we 
need a symbol to denote a probability whose value is not known (as distinct 
from a change in probability whose value is not known). This symbol will be 
~, so the triple (i : l : ~) means that the value of Pr(l) is unknown. While this 
profusion of symbols might seem baroque, it is unfortunately necessary in or- 
der to distinguish the different aspects of qualitative probabilistic reasoning. 
In fact the use of this kind of set of symbols hould be familiar from qual- 
itative reasoning [15]. In qualitative reasoning we consider variables and the 
changes in value of those variables. A given variable x can have a positive or 
negative value, denoted [+] or [-], and we also distinguish the landmark value 
[0]. We are also interested in the way x changes over time and handle this by 
considering the values of dx/dt. These values may also be [+], [0] and [-]. In 
QPR the same distinctions are made. We have the probability value 2, which 
corresponds to [+], and landmark values of 0 and 1. We also have the changes 
in probability T, I which correspond to [+] and [-] derivatives, and distin- 
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guish the landmark changes ~,  ~ and ~. The additional symbols obviate the 
use of  explicit derivatives. 
2.2. Non-material implication 
As mentioned above, ---, does not represent material  implication but a con- 
nection between the probabil it ies of  antecedent and consequent. This is the key 
to understanding the system. We take iwffs, which we will also call " implica- 
t ions", to denote that the antecedent of  the iwff has a probabil istic influence 
on the consequent. Thus we are not concerned with the probabi l i ty of  the iwff, 
but what the wffsays about  the probabil it ies of its antecedent and consequent. 
More precisely we take the triple (i : a ~ c : +) to denote the fact that: 
Pr(cla,S) >>, Pr(cl-~a,X) 
for all X c {x, -~x} for which there is a triple (i : x ~ c : s) (where s is any sign) 
or (i : -~x ---, c : s). The effect of  the X in this inequality is to ensure that the 
restriction holds whatever is known about  formulae other than c and a; what- 
ever the probabil it ies of  a and c, the constraint on the conditional probabil it ies 
holds. Similarly the triple (i : a ~ c : - )  denotes the fact that: 
Pr(c[a,X) <~ Pr(cl-~a,X) 
again for all X E {x,~x} for which there is a triple ( i :x-- ,  c :s)  or 
(i: ~x ~ c : s). It is possible to think of  an implication (i : a ~ c : +)  as 
meaning that there is a constraint on the probabi l i ty distribution over the for- 
mulae c and a such that an increase in the probabi l i ty of  a entails an increase in 
the probabi l i ty of  c, and an implication (i : a ~ c : - )  means that there is a 
constraint on the probabi l i ty distribution over the formulae c and a such that 
an increase in the probabi l i ty of  a entails a decrease in the probabi l i ty of c. We 
do not make much use of  triples such as (i : c ~ a : 0) 2 since they have no use- 
ful effect but include them for completeness. (i : c ~ a : 0) indicates that: 
Pr(cla, X) =- Pr(cl-~a,X) 
for all X E {x,-~x} for which there is a triple (i : x ~ c : s) or (i : ~x ~ c : s), 
and so denotes the fact that Pr(c) does not change when Pr(a) changes. We 
also have implications uch as (i : a ~ c : ?) which denotes the fact that the re- 
lationship between Pr(cla , X) and Pr(cl--,a ,X) is not known, so that if the prob- 
ability of a increases it is not possible to say how the probabil ity of  c will 
change. With this interpretation, implications correspond to qualitative influ- 
ences in QPNs. Just as in QPNs,  we require that implications are causally 
directed, by which we mean that the antecedent is a cause of  the consequent. 
2 As  a resul t  we wi l l  not  wor ry  about  the  poss ib i l i ty  o f  confus ing  (i : c --, a : 0) w i th  (i : l : 0) 
where  l is an  swff. 
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This is the usual restriction imposed in probabil istic networks [25] and, as will 
become apparent,  is necessary to ensure that the system is sound. 
This simple picture is complicated because we have categorical implications 
which allow formulae to be proved true or false. In particular, an implication 
(i : a --* c : ++)  indicates that when a is known to be true, then so is c. Thus it 
denotes a constraint on the probabi l i ty distribution across a and c such that if 
Pr(a) becomes 1, then so does Pr(c). This requires that: 
Pr(c la ,X ) = 1 
for all X E {x,--,x} for which there is a triple (i: x ~ c : s) or (i: ~x ~ c:  s) 
[19]. Note that this type of  implication also conforms to the conditions for im- 
plications labelled with +, and that if Pr(cl-~a,X) = 1 as well then Pr(e) is al- 
ways equal to Pr(a). Similarly, a probabil istic interpretation of  an implication 
(i : a ~ c : - - )  which denotes the fact that if a is true then c is false requires 
that: 
Pr(c]a,X) = 0 
for all X E {x, -~x} for which there is a triple (i : x --, c : s) or (i : -~x ~ c : s). 
The conditions imposed on the conditional values by these implications uggest 
the existence of  a further pair of  types of  categorical implication which are 
symmetric to those already introduced. We have an implication 
(i : a ~ c : -+)  which denotes the constraint: 
Pr(cl-~a,X ) = 1 
for all Y E {x,-~x} for which there is a triple (i: x --* c : s) or (i : ~x --* c : s), 
and an implication (i : a ~ c : +- )  which denotes the constraint: 
Pr(cl-~a,X ) = 0 
for all Y E {x,-~x} for which there is a triple (i : x ~ c : s) or (i : ~x --* c : s). 
2.3. Synergy 
Being able to handle synergy relations is an important part of  any qualita- 
tive probabil istic system, and while a detailed discussion of synergy is beyond 
the scope of  this article (see instead [6,8,30]), the following brief explanation is 
worthwhile. 
The basic idea, in the language we are discussing here, is that the relation- 
ships between formulae are not completely modular  in the same way that they 
are in logic. As an example, consider two implications (i: a ~ c:  +) and 
(i : b --~ c : +).  I f  these were logical implications, whatever was known about  
a would not affect the relationship between b and c. However, because we 
are dealing with probabil ity, a change in what is known about a might change 
the relationship between b and c. For  instance when the probabi l i ty of  a 
increases, this change may mean that Pr(e) increases less than before when 
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Pr(b) increases 3. It is this kind of interaction that synergy was first introduced 
[30] to capture, and the variety of synergy which describes this kind of interac- 
tion was later called additive synergy. 
Additive synergy, however, is not sufficient to describe all the possible types 
of interaction between the causes of some formula. Consider the implications 
(i : sprinkler ~ wet_grass : +) and (i : rain ~ wet_grass : +) which capture 
the fact that both rain and the use of a sprinkler make it more likely that 
the grass of my lawn will be wet. Now, if I know that my grass is wet, then 
as Pearl [25] famously pointed out, if Pr(sprinkler) increases, then Pr(rain) de- 
creases because the use of the sprinkler explains away the wet grass. This kind 
of intercausal [8] reasoning is described by another form of synergy - product 
synergy. 
As mentioned above, in this paper synergies are represented by formulae 
such as a ~ b ~ c which represents the synergy which exists between a and b 
with respect o c. Such synergistic formulae form the basis of triples such as 
(i : a w b --* c : +) in just the same way as simple and implicational formulae 
do, but with yet another denotation. In particular, (i : a ~ b --, c : +) denotes 
the fact that: 
Pr(cla ,b,X)Pr(c[-~a, ~b,S) >~ Pr(c[-~a, b,X)Pr(c[a, ~b,X), 
where as before, X ranges across all other formulae such that there are triples 
(i : x ~ c : s). Similarly, (i : a ~ b --~ c : - )  denotes the fact that: 
Pr(c[a, b,X)Pr( c[-~a, -~b,X) ~ Pr(cl~a, b,X)Pr( cla, ~b,X) 
and (i : a ~ b --~ c : 0) denotes the fact that: 
Pr(c[a, b,X)Pr(c[-~a, ~b,X) = Pr(cl-~a, b,X)Pr(c[a, ~b,X). 
In the terminology of [6] these are product synergies. In this paper we do not 
consider additive synergies, though they could be incorporated into the frame- 
work if it were desired, because they are of less direct use than product syner- 
gies. Furthermore we only consider synergies with values +, 0, and - though 
categorical synergies are certainly conceivable. 
3. The proof theory 
Section 2 introduced a language for describing probabilistic influences be- 
tween formulae. For this to be useful we need to give a mechanism for taking 
3 It should be noted that because the constraint on the probabilities of b and c is written in the 
way it is, taking into account all the possible other things that may affect Pr(c) in addition to Pr(b), 
it can never be the case that a change in Pr(a) will change the relationship between b and c to the 
extent hat increasing Pr(b) leads to a decrease in Pr(c). 
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C-rules 
Ax A FQp (St, {i},Sa) (i: st: sg) ~ .x 
A-El 
,x ~-qp (st  ^  st', G, Sg) 
A FQp (at, G, conj,,m (Sg)) 
A-E2 A J-qp (St A St', G, S9) 
FQ,. (St', G, conj~,.(Sg)) 
^.~ ~ ~-qlO (St, G, Sg) ~ ~-qp (St', G', Sg') 
Fop (St ^  St', G u G', conj~,t,o(Sg, o')) 
rE A FQe (-~St, G, Sg) 
A FOp (St, G, neg(Sg)) 
A I-qp (St, G, Sg) 
A FOp (-~St, G, neg(Sg)) 
-~-E 
A I'-qe (St, G, Sg) A I-.qp (St --+ St',Gt, Sg ~) 
A FOp (St', G U G', impelim (Sg, Sg')) 
E-rules 
-~-R A FOp (St',G, Sg) A I-op (St -~ St',G',Sg') 
A I-Op (St, G U G', imp,~ (Sg, Sg')) 
I-rules 
"-.~E1 A FOp (St W St' ..* St", G, Sg) A I-qp (St, G', Sg') A I-oP (St", G", 1) Fqp (St', G u G' u G", syn,,m (Sg, $g')) 
-,-*-E2 
A ~-q~. (St • St' ... St", G, Sg) A Fqp (St', G', Sg') A Fqe (St", G", 1) 
A FOp (St, G U G' U G", syn,lim (Sg, Sg')) 
Fig. 1. The consequence r lation ~-oe. 
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sentences in that language and using them to derive new sentences. In particu- 
lar we need to be able to take sentences describing changes in probability in 
particular formulae and use these, along with implicational nd synergistic for- 
mulae to establish changes in probability in other formulae. This is done using 
the consequence r lation FO~, which is defined in Fig. 1. The definition is in 
terms of Gentzen-style proof rules where the antecedents are written above 
the line and the consequence is written below. The consequence r lation oper- 
ates on a database of the kind of triples introduced in Section 2 and derives 
arguments about formulae from them. The concept of an argument is formally 
defined as follows. 
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Definition 1. An argument for a well-formed formula p from a database A is a 
triple (p, G, s) such that A ~-Qp (p, G, s). 
The sign s of the argument denotes omething about the probability of p 
while the grounds G identify the elements of the database used in the derivation 
ofp. 
To see how the idea of an argument fits in with the proof rules in Fig. 1, con- 
sider the rules 'Ax', 'A-I' and '~-E' .  The first says that from a triple (i : l : s) it 
is possible to build an argument for l which has sign s and a set of grounds {i} 
(the grounds thus identify which elements from the database are used in the 
derivation). The rule is thus a kind of bootstrap mechanism to allow the ele- 
ments of the database to be turned into arguments which other rules can then 
be applied to. The second rule says that from arguments for two different for- 
mulae it is possible to build an argument for their conjunction. The set of 
grounds for this argument is the union of the grounds for the two individual 
arguments and the sign is a function of their signs. The rule '~-E '  can be 
thought of as analogous to modus ponens. From an argument for a and an ar- 
gument for a ~ c it is possible to build an argument for c once the necessary 
book-keeping with grounds and signs has been carried out. 
Example 1. Consider the following database which denotes the fact that the 
proposition "premise" has a probability which increases to 1, and that there is 
a relation between the proposition premise and the proposition "conclusion" 
such that if the probability of premise becomes 1, so does the probability of 
conclusion. 
( f l  : premise : ~), Az 
(rl : premise --0 conclusion : ++). 
From the database, by application of Ax and ~-E,  it is possible to build the 
argument: 
AI F-Qp (conclusion, {r l , f l} ,  ~), 
since applying impel~m to ~ and ++ yields ~ (as we will see in a little while). 
Thus from the database it is possible to build an argument for the probability 
of conclusion becoming 1. 
The proof procedure used here differs in a couple of important ways from 
other similar logical proof systems. Both of these differences stem from the fact 
that QPR is dealing with probability values (albeit changes in probability) rath- 
er than just truth and falsity as is the case in classical logic. The first difference 
is that it matters whether there are several proofs for a given formula. In logic 
once there is a valid proof for a formula, the formula is known to be true. Here 
there may be an argument which suggests that the probability of a formula in- 
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• creases and another which suggests it decreases - to resolve the conflict it is 
necessary to combine the arguments as discussed later on. The second differ- 
ence is that it is usual to have two sets of proof rules for each connective, 
one set which specify how to introduce the connective into formulae and one 
set which specify how to eliminate connectives from formulae. The proof rules 
in Fig. 1 mainly consist of elimination rules. This reflects the focus of the sys- 
tem described in the paper which is intended to capture the reasoning possible 
in qualitative probabilistic networks. The system is thus intended to be used to 
establish changes in the probability of sets of formulae rather than to establish 
connections between sets of formulae. It is connections between sets of formu- 
lae, themselves formulae of the form a ~ c, which are the kind of formulae 
that the proof rules cannot build. Were the missing introduction rules included 
we would have a system which was capable, in the language of probabilistic 
networks, of inferring new arcs connecting nodes in addition to inferring things 
about nodes. 
In order to apply the proof rules to build arguments, it is necessary to supply 
the functions used in Fig. 1 to combine signs. This section introduces those 
functions and makes some remarks about the proof rules. Section 4 then 
proves the soundness and completeness of the proof procedure. 
We start with conjunction introduction and elimination. When introducing 
conjunction it is crucially important whether the propositions in question are 
independent or not (since it is often not possible to establish the probability 
of the conjunction of a pair of dependent formulae from the probabilities of 
the formulae alone). If the formulae are known to be independent then the fol- 
lowing definition applies. 
Definition 2. The function conjintro : Sg E {1,q~, T ,~,L~,0 ,  h~ } × Sg' e {1,~, 
T, ~ ,~,g ,  0, I,~} ~Sg"  E {1,~,T,~,]~,~,0, ~,~} is specified by Table 1 where, 
Table 1 
Conjunction introduction conjintro for conjuncts that are known to be independent 
1 1 # T ~ J. # 0 ~ 
T T T T T I ~ o I T 
~ ~ ~ # ~ ~ o ~ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I I I I I I ~ o I I 
~ T T ~ ~ ~ o I 
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as with all combinator tables in this paper, the first argument is taken from the 
first column and the second argument is taken from the first row. 
If the formulae are not known to be independent, hen the following defini- 
tion applies instead. 
Definition 3. The function conjintro : Sg e {1,~,T ,~,L~,0 ,  LI } x Sg' E 
{1, ~, T, ~ ,  1, g, 0, ~, I} ~ Sg" 6 {1, ~, T, ~ ,  l, ~, 0, I, 5} is specified by Table 2. 
It is clear that in most cases it is not possible to tell how the probability of 
the conjunction changes. Note that both Tables 1 and 2 are written so that 
when the result of a combination could be either 1 or a change in value (as when 
is combined with ,--*) the result given is always the change. This is because we 
always know that the value of a probability is 1 so giving it as a result is less 
informative. The value is only included to ensure that the functions used by 
~-Qp, in particular imPe,m and imprev, are closed. The reason for bothering to 
have separate definitions for independent and non-independent conjuncts is 
that it is possible to identify independent formulae once arguments have been 
built, and doing so allows more precise inferences to be made (as is easily seen 
by comparing Tables 1 and 2). 
When eliminating a conjunction with sign Sg we assign both conjuncts the 
sign: 
{ 1,~ if Sg = 1L conjel im(Sg ) : 1 if Sg : 1, 
otherwise, 
where conje,m (Sg) = 1,1~ means that conje,m (Sg) is either 1 or ~ (such values are 
propagated by carrying out the appropriate computation on both the signs in 
question [22]). What this means is that most of the time it is not possible to de- 
Table 2 
Conjunction introduction conj~.tro f r conjuncts that are not known to be independent 
T I I I I I g o I I 
I I I I I ~ o I I 
I I I I I ~ o I I 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
I I I I I I ~ o I I 
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termine how the probability of the conjuncts change. This is an unfortunate 
but unavoidable property of probability theory and can be seen to follow from 
conjunction introduction - conj~ji m is just the inverse of conji,tr o. 
The rules for handling negation are applicable only to swffs and permit nega- 
tion to be either introduced or eliminated by altering the sign, for example allow- 
ing (i : ~a : T) to be rewritten as (i : a : 1). This leads to the definition of neg. 
Definition 4. The function neg : Sg E { 1, ~', T, ~ ,  &, 4~, 0, I, ~) ~ Sg ~ { 1, ~', T, 
~ ,  ~, ~L, 0, I, ~} is defined by Table 3. 
Note that neg is not defined over the values ++,  +- ,  +, 0, - ,  -+ ,  and - - .  
Although an implication (i: a---, b: +) has a kind of inverse relation with 
(i : a ~ b : - ) ,  there is no such relation with (i: ~(a --* b) : s). Indeed, 
(i : -~(a ~ b) : s) is not even an implication, since its main connective is -~. It 
is not possible to apply neg to an implication - if neg is applicable, the formula 
it is applied to is not an implication. (In fact the alert reader will have noticed 
that (i: -~(a ~ b) : s) is not even a well-formed formula.) 
To deal with implication we need two further functions, impe~m to establish 
the sign of formulae generated by the rule of inference ~-E,  and irnprev to es- 
tablish the sign of formulae generated by --*-R. This means that imp~li m is used 
to combine the change in probability of a formula a, say, with the constraint 
that the probability of a imposes upon the probability of another formula c. 
Since this constraint is expressed in exactly the same way as qualitative influ- 
ences are in QPNs, irnp~li m performs the same function as ® [30], and is merely 
an extension of it. 
Definition 5. The function impelim:Sgcz{l,~,T,~,L4),O,L~}×Sg'E 
{++, +- ,  + ,0 , - ,  -+,--,?}~---~Sg" C {1,#,Y,~,J. ,#,O,$,l} is specified by 
Table 4. 
There are two things that are notable about Table 4. First, the asymmetry in
the table. This stems from the definition of the categorical implications. If the 
asymmetry did not exist, categorical implications would be close to logical bi- 
implications. Second, the fact that in this table, unlike those introduced previ- 
ously, I is the result of combining two signs neither of which is ~, for instance 1 
and +. This is the justification for including I as a sign - if it were not included 
the set of signs would not be closed under impe~m. 
Table 3 
Negation of swffs neg 
sg 1 f~ T ~ , ~ o I 
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Table 4 
Impl icat ion el iminat ion imp~ 
++ +-  + 0 - -+  - ? 
1 1 I ~ 1 I ~ 0 
T T T T ~ + 1 1 I 
L + ~ 1 ~ T I T I 
.U- ,L ~ 1 ~ t # T I 
0 ~ 0 ~ ~ ~ 1 ~ 
I I I I ~ I I I I 
The function irnprev which computes the sign of the antecedent of an impli- 
cation from that of the implication and its consequent, is similar, only differing 
in the way it handles categorical implications. 
Definition 6. The function imprev : Sg E {1, q~, $, ~ ,  $, ~, 0, I,1 } x Sg' e 
{++, +- ,  + ,0 , - ,  -+ , - - , ?}H Sg" E {I,~,T,,--+,£,~,O,I,I } is specified by 
Table 5. 
The difference is that categorical implications are only categorical in the di- 
rection in which they are specified. When reversed, implications with signs ++ 
and +-  behave in the same way as implications with sign +, and implications 
with signs - -  and -+ behave in the same way as implications with sign - .  
Note that, once again, ~ is required to ensure closure. 
We also need the function Syne, m in order to be able to reason with synergies. 
This follows directly from [31]. 
Table 5 
Impl icat ion reversal irnprev 
++ +-  + 0 - -+  - -  ? 
1 ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ ~ l 
# T T T ~ 1 1 1 I 
T T T T ~ 1 1 1 I 
4-4  +-+ ~ ~ 4-~ 4--+ 4.-+ ~-4 ~-4 
1 1 1 1 ~ T T T I 
0 ~ ~ ~ I ~ ~ ~ 
I I I ~ I I I I 
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Table 6 
Synergy elimination SYnelim 
277 
+ ~ T T +-+ ~ ~ ~ I 
0 +--+ ~ 4--+ +-+ ~ +--+ +--+ +--+ 
- ~ l J. ,--, T ? ~ I 
Definition 7. The function synel im:Sge{+,O,-}xSg'e{1,#,T,~,~, 
~,0, I,~} ~-+Sg" E {1,~, T,*-+, ~,&0,~,~} is specified by Table 6. 
The function syn,~,, is the last function required to define ~-Qe, and we can 
turn to issues of soundness and completeness. 
4.  Soundness  and  completeness  
Now, the aforementioned baroque appearance of the system might lead the 
sceptical reader to assume that the definitions given above are rather ad hoc 
and not to be trusted. However, they are not. The proof mechanism given 
above is provably sound and complete for the propagation of changes in prob- 
ability in the sense that it only computes changes that will occur according 
to probability theory, and it computes all such changes. This is shown by 
the results in this section. However, the business of proving soundness and 
completeness is not straightforward. The main problem is that the form of 
the results depends heavily on the kind of reasoning. As a result we have three 
sets of soundness and completeness results. The first is for causal reasoning, 
that is reasoning in the direction of the implications only. The second is for ev- 
idential reasoning, that is reasoning both in the direction of implications and in 
the opposite direction to implications, and involves dealing with the problems 
of d-separation. The third is for intercausal reasoning, that is reasoning that 
includes the elimination of synergies. 
4.1. Causal reasoning 
As mentioned above, a restriction when writing implicational formulae in 
QPR is that the direction of the implications must reflect causality in the same 
way that the direction of a directed arc in a probabilistic network [25] does. 
That is the consequent of an implication must be an effect of the antecedent. 
The reason for insisting on this direction is exactly the same as in probabilistic 
networks - to ensure that reasonable conclusions are drawn. If we restrict he 
kinds of arguments we build to those in which implications are only used in a 
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causal direction, in other words we only use the C-rules of ~-Qe to build argu- 
ments, soundness and completeness results are quite straightforward. 
To show this we first need to define what it means for formulae to be causes 
and effects of one another: 
Definition 8. A well-formed formula p is said to be a cause of a well-formed 
formula q if and only if it is possible to identify an ordered set of iwffs 
{al ~ Cl,...  ,an ~ cn} such that q is one of the conjuncts that make up cn or 
includes one or more of the conjuncts that make up cn, one or more of the 
conjuncts in every ai is also in ci-l, and p is one of the conjuncts that make up 
al or includes one or more of the conjuncts in al .  
In other words, p is a cause of q if it is possible to build up a trail of (causally 
directed) implications which link p to q. 
Definition 9. A well-formed formula p is said to be an effect of a well-formed 
formula q if and only if it is possible to identify an ordered set of iwffs 
{al ~ Cl,... ,an --* cn} such that q is one of the conjuncts that make up al or 
includes one or more of the conjuncts that make up al, one or more of the 
conjuncts in every ci is also in ai+l, and p is one of the conjuncts that make up 
cn or includes one of the conjuncts in cn. 
Thus p is an effect of q if it is possible to build up a trail of (causally directed) 
implications that link q to p. 
Given these definitions, it is possible to show that given information 
about the change in probability of some formula p, the C-rules of b-Qp 
may be used to soundly and completely compute arguments about the chan- 
ges in probability of the effects of p. However, this is not enough to show 
that QPR is sound and complete when using the C-rules. The problem is 
that, in general, there may be several different arguments for a single formu- 
la, and we therefore need a means of combining these in a sound way. We 
therefore define aflattening function flat which combines arguments by map- 
ping from a set of arguments A to the supported formula q and some overall 
measure of validity: 
flat : A ~ (q, v), 
where v is the result of a suitable combination of the signs of the arguments. 
Now, because the effect of each implication is defined to occur whatever other 
arguments are formed (this is a result of the constraint imposed on the condi- 
tional probabilities by the implications), all combinations are completely local, 
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Table 7 
Flattening flat 
1 1 1 1 1 1 1 1 
T 1 ~ T T I ~ o I T 
i 1 ~" I I I ,U, 0 I I 
~ ~ # ~ o ~ 
0 0 0 0 0 0 0 0 
and the structure of the arguments may be disregarded when flattening 4 (for 
exactly the same reason as when combining evidential trails in QPNs [7]). As 
a result, v is simply calculated as: 
v=@Sgi  
i 
for all (q, Gi, Sgi) E A, where @ is an extended version of the qualitative addi- 
tion function used by QPNs, defined as follows. 
Definition 10. The function @ : Sg E {1,~, T,~,$,~,0,~,2} x Sg' E 
{ 1, ff, T, ~ ,  $, ~,, ~, 2} ~ Sg" E {#, T, '--', 1, 4, ~, 2} is specified by Table 7. Blank 
spaces represent impossible combinations. 
With this function established we can at last give the overall procedure for 
determining the change in a formula q in which we are interested. This is 
1. Add a triple (i : p : s) for every formula p whose change in probability is 
known. 
2. Build A, the set of all arguments for q using the C-rules. 
3. Flatten this set to Flatc(A) where Flatc(A) = fiat(A). 5 
This naturally backward chaining procedure can obviously be extended to 
compute all the causal consequences of a given set of changes in probability. 
From the definitions of how changes in probability are combined and then 
flattened, it is possible to show that using the C-rules of t-Qe is sound. 
4 Though in other argumentation systems where structure is important, as when dealing with 
numerical probabilities for instance, structure can be taken into account when flattening. 
5 The reason for doing this should become clear in Section 4.2. 
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Theorem 11. The construction and flattening of arguments in QPR using only the 
C-rules of ~-Qp is sound with respect o probability theory. 
Proof. The proof starts by proving the soundness of the combinator tables used 
when applying the C-rules of FQj,: 
Conjunction introduction: Consider the probabilities Pr(a) and Pr(b) of the 
two formulae being conjoined. There are two cases to consider, in the first 
the formulae are known to be independent and in the second they are not 
known to be independent. If Pr(a) and Pr(b) are independent, then 
Pr(a A b) = Pr(a)Pr(b). Thus if at least one of Pr(a) and Pr(b) increases and 
the other does not decrease, then Pr(a A b) will increase. If one increases and 
one decreases, then the change in Pr(a A b) cannot be determined. If one in- 
creases to 1, and the other is either 1 or increases to 1, Pr(a A b) increases to 
1. If both Pr(a) and Pr(b) are 1 then Pr(a A b) is 1. Furthermore, if at least 
one of Pr(a) and Pr(b) decreases and the other does not increase, then 
Pr(a A b) will decrease. If one decreases and one increases, then the change 
in Pr(a A b) cannot be determined. If either Pr(a) or Pr(b) decrease to 0, then 
Pr(a A b) decreases to 0, and if either is 0, then so is Pr(a A b). If either a or b 
has the sign ~, then that is the sign of the conjunction, unless the other conjunct 
has a probability which is 0 or decreases to 0, since nothing can be said about 
its value. If one of a or b has the sign ~,  and the other has a sign which is either 
1, ~ or l then the probability of the conjunction does not change and so the 
conjunction has the sign ~--+. If a or b has the sign I and the other has the sign 
or 1, then the probability of the conjunction is not known, though it does not 
change and so we give the conjunction the sign I (preferring this to ~ since it 
makes it clear that there has been no combination with a value which is known 
to be ~,  though it would not be incorrect o use ~) .  This completes the proof 
for the case in which Pr(a) and Pr(b) are independent. 
Turning to the case in which Pr(a) and Pr(b) are not independent, he 
same sets of values can be considered. However, since P r (aAb)= 
Pr(a)Pr(bla ) = Pr(alb)Pr(b), it rapidly becomes clear that unless either Pr(a) or 
Pr(b) is 0 or decreases to 0, in which case Pr(a A b) is zero and decreases to zero 
respectively, there is little that can be said about he probability of the conjunc- 
tion because there is no constraint on the way in which Pr(bla ) and Pr(alb) 
change. Indeed, the only time that the probability of the conjunction can be 
predicted iswhen both Pr(a) and Pr(b) are 1 or increase to 1. If both are 1 then 
so is Pr(a A b), and if one increases to 1 and the other is either 1 or increases to 
1, the Pr(a A b) increases to 1. In all other cases, Pr(a A b) will have the sign ~. 
Conjunction elimination: There are two parts to the proof. One for the part 
of the function that gives ~ or 1, and one for the part that gives ~. For the first, 
the following suffices and follows directly from the functions for conjunction 
introduction. The only way in which Pr(a A b) can be 1 is if both Pr(a) and 
Pr(b) are 1. The only way in which Pr(a A b) can increase to 1 is if either 
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Pr(a) or Pr(b) increases to 1 and the other increases to 1 or is 1. Thus picking 
one of the two conjuncts, its probability either increases to 1 or is 1. Thus the 
first part is proved. For the second part we need the following argument. Giv- 
ing any sign as I is always sound (since it means that nothing at all is being said 
about the relevant probability). However, it is also possible to prove that no 
more precise rule can be proposed. This is done by considering the tables for 
conjunction introduction. Looking at the values in the tables it is clear that 
any sign that might be assigned to Pr(a A b) might be produced by a number 
of possible values of Pr(a) and Pr(b). Thus no firm conclusions about changes 
in Pr(a) and Pr(b) can be drawn from particular changes in Pr(a A b) other 
than ~ or 1. 
Implication elimination: First consider implications labelled with +. From 
the definition of such implications it is clear that combining any increase in 
probability (either T or #) with such an implication will generate a possible in- 
crease in probability, in other words a T. Similarly, combining any decrease in 
probability (either ~ or ~) with an implication labelled + will generate ~, com- 
bining no change in probability with such an implication will generate ~,  and 
combining a change of I with such an implication will generate a change of ~. 
Next, consider implications labelled with - .  Such an implication will also gen- 
erate ~ when combined with a change of ~ and +-* when combined with ~,  but 
will otherwise have the opposite behaviour to that of an implication labelled +. 
It is also clear that implications labelled with 0 will generate changes of 
whatever change they are combined with, and implications labelled with ~ will 
generate ~ when combined with all changes except ~;  in the latter case they 
will generate a change of ~ .  Combining any of these implications with values 
that are not changes (that is I, 0 or ~) will not yield either a change or a value 
which is known, in other words they will generate ~. This takes care of all non- 
categorical implications. 
Turning to categorical implications, the results also follow almost immedi- 
ately from the definitions. Consider an implication labelled ÷+. By definition 
this yields a change of ~ when combined with a change of # and a value of 1 
when combined with 1, and otherwise behaves exactly like an implication la- 
belled with +. Similarly, by definition an implication labelled +-  will give 
when combined with a change of # and 0 when combined with 0, but will oth- 
erwise behave like an implication labelled with +. The last two implications, 
- -  and -+ behave in a complementary fashion to ++ and +-  respectively. 
Negation elimination and introduction: Consider a, the formula whose sign is 
being computed. If Pr(~a) increases to 1 then clearly Pr(a) decreases to zero, 
and if Pr(-~a) decreases to 0 then clearly Pr(a) increases to one. This takes care 
of the function for ~ and ~. The other cases are handled similarly. This com- 
pletes the proof of the soundness of the relevant combinator tables. Because 
the tables are sound, the arguments built using them are also sound. Thus 
all the arguments that may be built concerning a formula are sound. All that 
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remains is to show that when several arguments for a formula are combined, 
the combination itself is sound. Thus it is necessary to show that flattening is 
sound. 
Flattening: The soundness of flattening follows from the fact that Table 7 is 
an extension of the qualitative addition function G used to combine changes in 
probability in qualitative probabilistic networks [30]. The differences between 
flat and • reflect he fact that categorical changes in probability cannot be al- 
tered by non-categorical changes and the spaces in the table follow from the 
fact that the probability of any variable cannot both increase to 1 and decrease 
to 0 simultaneously [19]. Thus flattening is sound. Since both building and flat- 
tening arguments i sound, QPR itself is sound. [] 
The notable thing about this result, in contrast o later ones, is that the 
soundness of the individual arguments generated by ~-oe does not depend upon 
flattening. Each argument is itself sound - once we have an argument which 
says, for instance, that the probability ofp may increase, that is we have an ar- 
gument (p, G, T), it is not possible to deduce that the probability ofp will not 
increase. The closest hat one can come to deducing thatp will not increase is if 
it is possible to build another argument (p : G' : ~), which says that the prob- 
ability of p might decrease. Then the result of flattening these two is the con- 
clusion (p, I) which indicates that it is not possible to rule out any change 
in p. The whole deduction has a certain locality which makes QPR rather closer 
to logic than to probabilistic networks. However, the fact that later conclusions 
can throw doubt on earlier ones means that QPR is not monotonic (a point ex- 
plored at greater length in [23]). 
Before moving on to completeness, we need to identify precisely what kind 
of completeness we are talking about. What we want to show is that when 
using the C-rules, QPR computes all the changes in probability of all the effects 
of a formula: 
Definition 12. The construction and flattening of arguments is said to be 
causally complete in some system of qualitative probability with respect o 
some formula p if it is possible to use that system to compute the sign of all the 
effects ofp. 
With this definition it is possible to state and prove the following theorem. 
Theorem 13. The construction and flattening of arguments in QPR using only the 
C-rules of bop is causally complete with respect o any well-formed formula. 
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Proof. Thanks to the careful choice of proof rules, the completeness proof 
follows from the definition of ~-Qp. That is the change in probability of all the 
effects of any well-formed formula p which may be stated in QPR can be made 
by the application of the appropriate proof rules. This can be seen as follows. 
Consider the addition of the triple (i : p : T) where p contains no negation 
symbols, to a database which only contains formulae without negation 
symbols. There are six types of effect of p. The first are the consequents of 
implications in which p forms the antecedent. The changes in probability 
of such effects may be established using ~-E. The second are the consequents 
of implications in which p is one of the conjuncts of the antecedent. The 
changes in probability of such effects may be established using A-I and ~-E. 
The third are are the consequents of implications the antecedent of which 
involves ome conjuncts that are part ofp. The changes in probability of such 
effects may be established using A-El, A-E2 and ~-E. The fourth set of effects 
are those which are subsets of the conjuncts in the consequents of implications 
which have p either as the antecedent, one of the conjuncts of the antecedent, 
or for which some of the conjuncts that make up p are the antecedent. The 
changes in probability of such effects may be established by the following 
method. Use what is known about p to establish the change in probability of 
the whole consequent by applying the appropriate method (one of the first 
three) and then apply A-E and A-E2. A very similar procedure can be used to 
establish the change in probability of effects which include some conjuncts in 
the consequent of implications for which p relates to the antecdent, possibly 
using A-I as well. Such formulae constitute the fifth set of effects. These five sets 
of effects are all those which are connected in some way to p by a single 
implication. The sixth set of effects are those which are related to p by two or 
more implications. The changes in probability of such sets may be obtained by 
recursively applying the procedure for the first five sets of effects. The 
appropriate use of -~-I and -~-E make it possible to handle situations in which 
negation symbols appear. Thus all the changes in causes ofp  that result from 
the change in probability ofp can be computed, and QPR is causally complete 
with respect o any formula. [] 
Example 2. As an example of causal reasoning consider the following example 
borrowed from [7]. We have the following probabilistic influences: 6
(rl : HeOx_Temp ~ Ox_Tank_Leak : +), A2 
(r2 : HeOx_Temp ~ High_Ox_Temp : +), 
(r3 : High_Ox_Temp ~ Ox_TankLeak : +). 
6 Of course the variables are binary valued rather than continuous as in the original so we must 
think of variable values such as HeOx_Temp = high rather than actual temperatures. 
284 s. Parsons I Internat. J Approx. Reason. 19 (1998) 265-297 
When we have evidence that Pr(HeOx_Temp) is increasing, so that the triple 
( f l  : HeOx_Temp : T) is added to the database, it is possible to build two argu- 
ments concerning Pr(Ox_Tank_Leak): 
A2 ~-Qp (Ox_TankLeak, { f l , r l} ,  T), 
A2 ~-Qp (Ox_TankLeak, {f l , r l , r2},  T). 
The first is built by combining f l  and rl using ~-E,  The second is built by 
combining f l  and r2 using --+-R and then chaining the result of this with r3 
using ~-E  again. These two arguments may then be flattened to give the pair 
( Ox_Tank Leak, T ) . 
This is all we will say about causal reasoning using QPR, and we turn to 
using the system to reason both in the direction of the implications and in 
the opposite direction to the implications. 
4.2. Evidential reasoning 
Unfortunately there is more to allowing implications to be reversed than just 
adding the proof rule ~-R  to t-Op. In particular there are two problems which 
need to be solved. The first problem arises because when implications are re- 
versed it is possible for the proof procedure to loop and therefore build an in- 
finite number of arguments. This is illustrated by the following example. 
Example 3. Consider the following database: 
( f l :  a:  T), A3 
(r l :  a ---~ b : +), 
(r2: b--*d:  +), 
(r3: a~e:  - ) ,  
(r4: c---*d: +). 
By applying ---~-E twice to f l ,  rl and r2 it is possible to build an argument for 
an increase in the probability of d and then by using --.-R twice on r4 and r3 it 
is possible to build an argument for a decrease in the probability of a. This new 
information about a may then be used to build a new argument for a decrease 
in the probability of d, and this in turn can be used to build a new argument for 
an increase in the probability of a. This process could clearly be continued for 
ever. 
In fact, it is not even necessary to have a "loop" in the implications since it is 
perfectly possible to build a causal argument from a to b and then to d and then 
build an evidential argument back to b and then to a. Happily this problem is 
easy to solve by introducing the idea of a minimal argument. 
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Definition 14. A minimal argument is an argument in which no implication 
appears more than once. 
The way that minimality is introduced in QPR, as we shall see, is in the flat- 
tening of evidential arguments. This is conceptually simple since it allows the 
construction (as opposed to flattening) of arguments to be the same in both 
causal and evidential cases. However, there are a couple of points that should 
be made with reference to this. The first is that in practice it is both simple and 
desirable to check for minimality during the construction of arguments. Simple 
because it is easy to check whether an implication has been used before when 
applying the proof rules and desirable since it prevents the proof system being 
used to build infinite arguments. The second point is that under the usual re- 
striction placed on probabilistic networks, cycles of implications (which would 
make it possible to reason causally from a formula and cycle back to it again) 
are forbidden in QPR so that non-minimal rguments are not a feature of caus- 
al reasoning. It is also worth noting that minimal arguments mirror the idea of 
minimal trails introduced by Druzdzel [7]. 
The second problem with evidential arguments arises due to the need to han- 
dle conditional independence properly. If we apply the proof rules blindly, we 
may build arguments concerning a formula which depend upon information 
about other formulae which are conditionally independent of it. Thus it is pos- 
sible to build arguments which are not valid according to probability theory, 
and, just like the non-minimal arguments discussed above, they must be 
weeded out in the flattening process. To identify invalid arguments we need 
to develop something for arguments in QPR which is analagous to d-separa- 
tion [25] in probabilistic networks. We do this using the following definition 
of d-separation adapted from those in Jensen's recent book [14] (because I can- 
not imagine bettering Jensen's motivation for d-separation, any reader who 
wants more information about what it is and why it is important is referred 
to [14], pp. 7-14). First, however, we need some additional definitions: 
Definition 15. A source of an argument (p, G, s) is an swff from G. 
Thus a source of an argument is one of the simple formula which ground it, 
and form the head of a chain of implications. 
Definition 16. The destination of an argument (p, G, s) is p. 
Definition 17. Two formulae p and q are d-separated if for all arguments which 
have p as a source and q as their destination, there is another formula r such 
that either 
1. p is a cause of r, r is a cause of q and the probability of r is 1 or 0; or 
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2. p and q are both causes o f r  and there is no argument (r, G',s') such that all 
the swffs in G' are effects of r. 
With these ideas fixed we can establish the idea of an invalid argument as 
one that is built without aking account of d-separation: 
Definition 18. An argument A = (p, G, s) is invalid if any of the sources of A are 
d-separated from p. 
Definition 19. An argument A = (p, G, s) is valid if it is not invalid. 
In other words there are two situations in which an argument is invalid. The 
first is if it involves a chain of implications through some formula which is 
known to be either true or false. The second is if it involves a chain of impli- 
cations from the causes of some formula r to r and then back to further causes 
of r and there is no argument for r from any of its effects. This is illustrated by 
the following example. 
Example 4. Consider the following database: 
( f l :  a:  T), A4 
(r l :  a---~b: +), 
(r2: b---*c: +), 
( r3 :e~c:  - ) ,  
(r4: c-- -* f :  +). 
By applying ~-E  twice to f l ,  rl and r2 it is possible to build an argument 
(c, {f l ,  r l ,  r2}, T) for an increase in the probability of c. This argument is val- 
id, but would be invalid if the triple (f2 : b : 1) were also in 34. 
Now, consider extending the argument for an increase in probability of c by 
using ~-R  on r3 and what was deduced about c to build an argument for a 
decrease in the probability of e. This second argument (e, {f l ,  r l ,r2, r3}, ~) 
is invalid, but would be valid if the triple (f3 : f : T) were in the database be- 
cause it would then be possible to build a valid argument whose destination 
was c and whose grounds only included the effects of c. 
The idea of an invalid argument makes it possible to eliminate the kind of 
problems discussed by Pearl [24] in his exhortation for the use of causality in 
default reasoning, without he need to distinguish between causal and eviden- 
tial rules. Furthermore, it gives QPR the same kind of ability as symbolic aus- 
al networks [5] to ensure that changes in belief, expressed as probabilities, are 
consistent with ideas of causality, without he need to associate a network with 
a set of logical clauses. Of course, the need to identify invalid arguments and 
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rule them out means that, when used for evidential reasoning, QPR is no long- 
er purely local in the way in which it is when used for causal reasoning. How- 
ever, it is precisely this non-locality which makes it possible to ensure that 
adequate account is taken of d-separation without he need to have a graphical 
model as well as the logical clauses. 
In keeping with the style of presentation adopted so far, we can think of ap- 
plying the minimality and validity restrictions on arguments by applying a 
function fia% 1 to the set of all arguments A for a formula p: 
fla% 1 : A ~ {A E A I A is minimal and valid}. 
Now, if there are several minimal valid arguments for a given formula, we can 
combine these to get a single overall argument using a second flattening func- 
tion fla% 2. Like fiate 2this maps from a set of arguments A to the supported for- 
mula p and some overall measure of validity: 
rate2 : A F-~ (p, v), 
where v is once again the result of a suitable combination of the signs of the 
arguments. In fact it turns out that v is computed in exactly the same way as 
for causal reasoning, so that the function rate2 is exactly the same as fiat. Thus 
the procedure for finding the sign of a formula p when reasoning both causally 
and evidentially is
1. Add a triple (i : q : s) for every formula q whose change in probability is 
known. 
2. Build A, the set of all arguments for p using the C-rules and E-rules. 
3. Flatten this set to Flate(A) where Flate(A) = fiat(fiatel(A)). 
With this procedure in mind, we can prove the following. 
Theorem 20. The construction and flattening of arguments in QPR using only the 
C-rules and E-rules of ~-QP is sound with respect o probability theory. 
ProoL The proof proceeds by showing first that the individual proof rules are 
locally sound, in that given particular premises they generate the appropriate 
conclusions, and then showing that the flattening procedure rules ensures the 
soundness of whole arguments. The first stage is particularly easy since the 
soundness of the C-rules was proved in Theorem 11. We therefore need only to 
consider implication reversal. 
Implication reversal: The soundness of Table 5 can be proved as follows. Any 
implication (i: a ~ c : +) indicates a constraint Pr(cla,X) >>. Pr(cl-~ a,X). 
This constraint implies that Pr(alc, Y) i> Pr(a]-,c, Y) as proved by Wellman 
[30]. This can be considered as meaning that a consequence of the first impli- 
cation is that there is another implication (i: c ~ a:  +) (though this will 
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not be causally directed). This second implication can then be combined with 
information about the change in probability of c to obtain the relevant column 
in the table just as for implication elimination in the proof of Theorem 11. Sim- 
ilar reasoning takes care of the cases for which the sign of the implication is - ,  
0 and ?. A categorical implication (i : a ~ c : ++) or (i : a ~ c : -+)  is just a 
more extreme version of (i : a ~ c : +), and while it won't necessarily reverse 
to give a categorical implication, it will reverse just like (i : a ~ c : +). Similar- 
ly a categorical implication (i : a ~ c : - - )  or (i : a ~ c : +- )  is just a more 
extreme version of (i : a ~ c : - ) ,  and while it won't necessarily reverse to give 
a categorical implication, it will reverse just like (i : a ~ c : - ) .  This completes 
the proof of the soundness of implication reversal. 
Now, this local procedure will sometimes be unsound, but only in the course 
of building an invalid argument (since the only unsound arguments which may 
be built are invalid), and such an argument will be rejected by the flattening 
function. In fact, strictly speaking, we do not actually need to worry about 
d-separation at all. The worst that could happen if we ignored it is that some 
formula whose probability cannot change, because it is d-separated from the 
only formula whose probability is known to change, has its change in proba- 
bility computed as T or ~ (it cannot be # or g because categorical changes can- 
not result from the application of ~-R).  Since T and ~ indicate ither a change 
or no change this is not incorrect, but it is possibly misleading. 
Flattening: There are two aspects to the soundness of flattening. The first is 
the soundness of minimal valid arguments, and the second is the soundness of 
the way in which such arguments are combined. Both follow from the close 
correspondence b tween implications and arcs in qualitative probabilistic net- 
works. The first is proven as follows. Minimal valid arguments correspond to 
minimal active trails in QPNs [7] and the soundness of the changes in proba- 
bility that they identify follows from the soundness of the individual combina- 
tions proven above and the fact that non-valid, non-minimal rguments (where 
the calculation of changes is not sound) are removed. The second aspect of 
soundness may then be shown. The validity of combining different arguments 
also follows from the correspondence with evidential trails and the fact that 
Table 7 is an extension of the qualitative addition function • used to combine 
the results of such trails [7]. The differences between flat and @ reflect he fact 
that categorical changes in probability cannot be altered by non-categorical 
changes and the spaces in the table follow from the fact that the probability 
of any variable cannot both increase to 1 and decrease to 0 simultaneously 
[19]. Thus flattening is sound. 
Since both building and flattening arguments is sound, QPR itself is 
sound. [] 
Given that evidential reasoning is sound, the next question is to what extent 
is it complete. We are interested in the following notion of completeness. 
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Definition 21. The construction and flattening of arguments is said to be 
evidentially complete in some system of qualitative probability with respect o 
some formula p if it is possible to use that system to compute the signs of all the 
effects of p, all the causes ofp and all the causes and effects of all the causes and 
effects ofp. 
With this definition it is possible to prove the following. 
Theorem 22. The construction and flattening of arguments in QPR using only the 
C-rules and E-rules of ~-Q? is causally and evidentially complete with respect o 
any formula. 
Proof. Given information about the change in probability of any well-formed 
formula, by Theorem 13 it is possible to calculate the change in probability of 
any effect of that formula. Now, a procedure which is identical to that 
described in Theorem 13 but using ~-R  as well as ~-E  may be applied to 
establish the change in probability of any effect of any well-formed formula. 
Applying both procedures recursively as necessary suffices to ensure vidential 
completeness. [] 
Finally, we have an example of evidential reasoning in QPR. 
Example 5. As an example of the kind of reasoning possible in QPR consider 
the extension of the example of causal reasoning: 
(rl : HeOx_Temp ~ HeOx_Temp_Probe : +), A5 
(r2 : HeOx_Temp --~ High_Ox_Temp : +), 
(r3 : HeOx_Temp --~ Ox_Tank_Leak : +), 
(r4 : High_Ox_Temp ~ Ox_Tank_Leak : +). 
When we have evidence that Pr(HeOx_Temp_Probe) is increasing, so that the tri- 
ple (f l  : HeOx_Temp_Probe : T) is added to the database, it is possible to build 
two minimal, valid arguments concerning Pr(Ox_Tank_Leak): 
A5 ~-~p (Ox_Tank_Leak, {fl,  rl, r3}, T), 
A5 F-O? (Ox_Tank_Leak, {fl,  rl, r2, r4}, T). 
The first is built by combining f l  and rl using ~-R  and then combining the 
result of this with r3 using ~-E. The second is built by combining f l  and rl 
using ~-R  and then chaining the result of this with r2 and r4 using ~-E  twice. 
These combine to give the pair (Ox_TankdLeak, T) indicating that overall it is 
possible to infer that knowledge about the increasing probability of 
HeOx_Temp_Probe, which is the kind of thing that can be observed, makes it 
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possible to infer that the probability of Ox_Tank_Leak may increase, which is 
the kind of thing that would be useful to know in the context of this example. 
Using the C and E-rules, QPR captures Wellman's version of QPNs [30] up 
to the handling of additive synergy. The next section discusses how to extend 
QPR so that it handles intercausal reasoning. Doing so permits QPR to capture 
Druzdzel's [6] version of QPNs which do not deal with additive synergy but do 
employ intercausal reasoning. 
4.3. Intercausal reasoning 
In comparison to the extension to evidential reasoning, the extension of 
QPR to enable it to allow intercausal reasoning is relatively straightforward. 
Because of the way the synergy elimination rules --~-E1 and ----~-E2 are defined, 
it is only ever possible to apply them validly. Thus, all that we have to do is to 
add the I-rules to the proof procedure and we can immediately obtain a sound 
and complete system. No new flattening function is required since the I-rules 
do not introduce new forms of invalid argument. 
As ever, before showing soundness we need to state the complete proof pro- 
cedure, and we do this in the familiar backward chaining way - the procedure 
for finding the sign of a formula p when reasoning causally, evidentially and 
intercasually is.
1. Add a triple (i : q : s) for every formula q whose change in probability is 
known. 
2. Build A, the set of all arguments for p using the C-rules, E-rules and I-rules. 
3. Flatten this set to Flate(A) where Flate(A) = flat(flate 1(A)). 
Theorem 23. The construction and flattening of arguments in QPR using the 
C-rules, E-rules and 1-rules of hQe is sound with respect o probability theory. 
Proof. We already have Theorem 20 which shows that ~-Qe combined with 
Flate(.) is sound when using the C-rules and the E-rules. Thus all we need to 
show is that synergy elimination is sound with respect o probability theory. 
Fortunately, the soundness of synergy elimination follows directly from the 
definition of SYnelim and Druzdzel's results on intercausal reasoning, and so the 
use of QPR with the C-rules, E-rules and I-rules is sound. [] 
So proving soundness i  relatively easy. Proving completeness, a  ever, is de- 
pendent upon defining anotion of completeness, and to do this we need to cap- 
ture the fact that one formula can be related intercausally with another. In fact 
we need to express the idea that two formulae can be directly related by an in- 
tercausal link (when they share a common effect and so are the two antecedents 
of a synergistic wff) and may also be indirectly related (when they are related 
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via a number of intermediate formulae some of which are synergistic wffs). The 
first idea is captured by the notion of intercausal connection, the second by the 
notion of intercausal relation: 
Definition 24. A well-formed formula p is said to be intercausally connected to a 
well-formed formula q if and only if there is a ywffp ~ q--* r for some formula 
Y. 
Definition 25. A well-formed formula p is said to be intercausally related to a 
well-formed formula q if and only if it is possible to identify an ordered set of 
ywffs {xl ~yl "--~Zl,...xn ~yn"--~Zn}, where p is either a cause or effect of xl, 
each yi is a cause or an effect of each Xi+l and q is a cause or effect ofyn. 
In other words, two formulae are intercausally related if it is possible to 
build an argument which has one as its source and the other as its destination, 
and they are joined by a chain of implications and synergy relations. We then 
have the following. 
Definition 26. The construction and flattening of arguments is said to be 
intercausally complete in some system of qualitative probability with respect o 
some well-formed formula p if in addition to being evidentially complete, it is 
possible to calculate all the changes in probability of all formulae that p is 
intercausally related to. 
With this definition it is possible to prove the following. 
Theorem 27. The construction and flattening of arguments in QPR using the C- 
rules, E-rules and I-rules of ~-QP is intercausally complete with respect to any 
formula. 
Proof. Again the proof follows almost immediately from the corresponding 
result for evidential reasoning. Starting from a known change in a proposition 
p, evidential completeness guarantees that we can find the changes in 
probability of all causes and effects of p and the causes and effects of those 
causes and effects. Synergy elimination then makes it possible to soundly 
establish any changes in probability of any formulae that are intercausally 
connected to any of the causes and effects of p. Once again the calculation of 
changes in probability of the causes and effects of the intercausally connected 
formulae is guaranteed by evidential completeness, and the recursive applica- 
tion of synergy elimination ensures intercausal completeness. [] 
This kind of completeness is the same as is possible in a probabilistic net- 
work. In a probabilistic network it is possible to calculate the probability of 
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any node which is connected, via a set of nodes, to nodes about which evidence 
is obtained. In QPR, it is 15ossible to compute the change in probability of any 
formula which is "connected", in the sense of being a cause of or an effect of or 
intercausally related to, any formula for which the change in probability is 
known. 
Finally, we give an example of intercausal reasoning in QPR. 
Example 6. As an example of the kind of reasoning possible in the full version 
of QPR consider this final extension of the running example: 
(rl : HeOx_Temp ~ HeOx_Temp_Probe : +), A6 
(r2 : HeOx_Temp ~ High_Ox_Temp : +), 
(r3 : HeOx_Temp ~ Ox_TankLeak : +), 
(r4 : High_Ox_Temp ~ Ox_Tank_Leak : +), 
(r5: Ox_Tank_Leak ~ Ox_Pressure_Low : - ) ,  
(r6 : HeOx_ValveA~roblem ~ Ox_Pressure_Low : - ) ,  
(r7 : Ox_Tank_Leak ~ HeOx_Valve_Prob lem ~ OxA~ressure_Low: - ) .  
When we have evidence that Pr(HeOx_Temp_Probe) is increasing and 
oxygen pressure is known to be low so that the formulae 
OCl : HeOx_Temp_Probe : T) and (f2 : Ox_Pressure_Low: 1) are added to the 
database, as before it is possible to build two minimal, valid arguments con- 
cerning Pr( Ox_Tank_Leak ) :
A6 [-Qp (Ox_Tank_Leak,{fl,rl,r3}, T),
A6 ~-Qp (Ox_Tank_Leak, {f l , r l , r2 ,  r4}, T). 
Both of these may then be used along with f2,  r7, and --*-El to build argu- 
ments concerning Pr(HeOx_Valve_Problem): 
,d 6 [-Qp (HeOx_Valve_Problem, { f l , f2 ,  rl,r4, r7}, ~), 
z~ 6 ~-Qp (HeOx_Valve_Problem, {f l , f2 ,  rl ,  r2, r3, r7}, +), 
which flatten to tell us that the probability of HeOx_Valve_Problem ay de- 
crease. Thus the overall impact of the evidence is to suggest that it has become 
more likely that there is a leak in the oxygen tank and less likely that there is a 
problem with the helium/oxygen tank valve. 
With these results, QPR gives us a sound proof-theoretic means of comput- 
ing changes in probability propagated in both causal and evidential directions 
as well as across intercausal links. Thus QPR captures Druzdzel's version of 
QPNs. What this means is that if we encode our probabilistic knowledge of 
the world by writing down any set of swffs, iwffs and ywffs we can then build 
arguments for and against formulae using ~-op and use these to identify the 
changes in probability of those formulae warranted by probability theory. If, 
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after building arguments and flattening we have an pair (St, Sg)  where St  is any 
wffthen Sg indicates the change in probabil ity of  St ,  indicating it increases to 1 
if Sg =~, decreases if Sg = ~ and so on. If, on the other hand we have (S t ,  Sg)  
where St  is an iw f f  v --* w then Sg indicates the constraint between Pr(v) and 
Pr(w), and if St  is a ywf f then  Sg  indicates the constraint between the three con- 
stituent formulae. The full denotation of  any pair (S t ,  Sg)  is given by Tables 8-  
10. Since QPR is sound and complete any sign computed in this way will be 
correct, and if there is enough information to compute the sign, then it will 
be computed. 
5. Discussion 
The first question that arises when considering QPR is why QPR is better 
than the QPN formalism, and so worth developing. There are a couple o f  rea- 
sons why I think that this is so. Firstly, the system has the potential to be con- 
siderably more expressive than QPNs. As it stands, QPR can reason about 
Table 8 
What a derived formula means (part 1) 
If And And Then 
St = w Sg= l 
St = w Sg = # 
St = w Sg = T Pr(w)i.iti~t = P 
St = w Sg = ~ Pr(w)i.i~. t = p 
St = w Sg = ~ Pr(w)i.i,i~t = p 
St = w Sg = ~ 
St = w Sg = O 
St = w Sg = ~ Pr(w)i.,i~ t = p 
St = w Sg = ~ 
Pr(w)~.a l = 1 
Pr(w)fi.~ t = 1 
p ~< Pr(w)~.a t ~< 1 
Pr(w)fi.o t = p 
p ~> Pr(w)fi.a l = 0 
Pr(w)~..~ =0 
Pr(w)~.~ t = 0 
0 ~< Pr(w)~..~ < i 
0 ~< Pr(w)~.a t ~< 1 
Table 9 
What a derived formula means (part 2) 
If And Then 
St = v --* w Sg=++ 
St=v~w Sg= +-  
S t=v~w Sg= + 
St=v~w Sg=O 
St = v ---~ w Sg = - 
St = v --~ w Sg = -+ 
St = v---~ w Sg : - -  
S t=v~w Sg= ? 
Pr(wlv, x) = 1 
Pr(w I~v,x) = 0 
Pr(wlv, x ) >>. Pr (w l -w,x  )
pr(w Iv, x) = Pr(w I~v, x) 
Pr(wlv, x ) <~ ~(wl~o,x )  
Pr(w]~v,x) = 1 
Pr(wlv, x) = 0 
The relationship between Pr(w]v, x) and Pr(w I~v, x) is unknown. 
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Table 10 
What a derived formula means (part 3) 
If And Then 
St = u W v"-*w Sg = + Pr(wlu , v,X) .  Pr(wl~u, ~v,X)) >1 Pr(w]u, ~v,X) .  Pr(w[--u, v,X) 
St  = u ~ v"'~w Sg = 0 Pr(wlu, v ,S) .  Pr(wl~u, ~v,X)) = Pr(wlu,-~v,X). Pr(wl~u, v,X) 
St = u ~3 v"-*w Sg = - Pr(wlu, v X) . Pr(wl-~u , ~v,X) ) <~ Pr(wlu, ~v,X) . Pr(wl~u, v,S) 
conjunctions which QPNs cannot, so it is more expressive (though it is argu- 
able how useful the conjunctions are) and it is possible to extend QPR to han- 
dle disjunction and thus material implication [21] which makes it possible to 
combine logical deduction with the kind of probabilistic propagation discussed 
in this paper. Secondly, QPR has the potential to be a first order system and so 
could be used as a means of building specific QPNs from more general know- 
ledge - a form of model-based knowledge construction. Thirdly, QPR seems to 
offer a more natural means of representing the kind of qualitative probabilistic 
information discussed here than QPNs do. The key to both QPNs and QPR is 
that the influences that they deal with are defined to hold irrespective of what 
other influences also hold. In other words the information contained in an iw f f  
or an arc in a QPN is essentially modular and unaffected by whatever other in- 
fluences exist in a particular model. This is reflected more directly in QPR than 
in QPNs since QPR only takes the structure of the influences into account 
when necessary (which is when d-separation comes into play). 
Another question that might be posed is how QPR relates to Neufeld's 
probabilistic default reasoner [17,18]. The answer seems to be that because 
the "rules" in QPR make stronger assertions than those in Neufeld's ystem, 
it is possible to get completeness results in QPR which are not possible in 
Neufeld's work. As an example, consider the way in which both systems repre- 
sent the fact that c is positively influenced by both a and b. Both can conclude 
that c becomes more probable if a becomes more probable and that c becomes 
more probable if b becomes more probable. In QPR it is also possible to con- 
clude that c becomes more probable if both a and b become more probable be- 
cause the effects of a and b are defined to occur whatever other influences bear 
on c. However, in Neufeld's system if both a and b become more probable, 
nothing can be said about the change in probability of c. The relationship be- 
tween Neufeld's ystem and the kind of proof theoretic reasoning provided by 
QPR is discussed further in [20,21]. Of course, the flipside of this completeness 
is the need to make stronger assertions when writing down rules, and this will 
lead to more influences being given the sign ? because it is not possible to state 
that they hold whatever other information is true. Thus one can think of QPR 
as being limited to expressing precise assertions about less of the world than 
Neufeld's ystem but as a result being able to be more complete in the inferenc- 
es it makes about the portion of the world it represents. 
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6. Summary 
295 
This paper has discussed a means of building a proof theoretic system which 
is capable of reasoning about changes in probability. It is thus in some senses 
an extension of previous work on systems of argumentation a d of systems of 
qualitative probability. With a solid basis in probability theory, the system can 
be used to combine the advantages of a sound means of handling uncertainty 
with the flexibility of a logical method of knowledge representation [1], a flex- 
ibility that can be increased by extending it to a full first order system and in- 
cluding disjunction and material implication. Because of its qualitative nature, 
the system may be used when probabilistic knowledge of a domain is incom- 
plete, making it applicable to a wider range of situations than systems that de- 
pend on complete probabilistic information, while the fact that it is soundly 
based on probability theory make it a useful basis for a qualitative decision the- 
ory [11,12]. The system described in this paper clearly has similarities with oth- 
er systems described in the literature. Some of these similarities have been 
described in the paper. Others are explored elsewhere [20,21]. Yet others, in- 
cluding those with the systems described in [3,28,29], are the subject of on-go- 
ing work. 
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